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(We do not neccessarily agree with everything that is said by the author ? Ed. ) （我们不一定完全同意这是作者所说的吗？版。）

The media have become obsessed with something called “媒体已经成为所谓的东西痴迷“ Islam伊斯兰教 ,” which in their voguish lexicon has acquired only two meanings, both of them unacceptable and impoverishing. “，这在其风行一时的词汇已经收购了只有两个意思，双方都不能接受的，导致贫穷。 On the one hand, “Islam” represents the threat of a resurgent atavism, which suggests not only the menace of a return to the Middle Ages but the destruction of what Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan calls the democratic order in the Western world.一方面，“伊斯兰”代表复活的返祖现象，这意味着不仅对中世纪的回报是什么威胁，但参议员丹尼尔帕特里克莫尼汉呼吁在西方世界的民主秩序遭到破坏的威胁。 On the other hand, “Islam” is made to stand for a defensive counterresponse to this first image of Islam as threat, especially when, for geopolitical reasons, “good” Moslems like the Saudi Arabians or the Afghan Moslem “freedom fighters” against the Soviet Union are in question.另一方面，“伊斯兰”是由参选防御counterresponse作为威胁，这对伊斯兰教的第一形象，尤其是当对地缘政治原因，“好”像沙特或阿富汗穆斯林穆斯林“自由战士”对苏联的问题。 Anything said in defense of Islam is more or less forced into the apologetic form of a plea for Islam's humanism, its contributions to civilization, development and perhaps even to democratic niceness.在所说的话是对伊斯兰教的防御或多或少成为一个伊斯兰教的人文主义被迫认罪道歉的形式，对文明的贡献，发展，甚至对民主niceness。

Along with that kind of counterresponse there is the occasional foolishness of trying to equate Islam with the immediate situation of one or another Islamic country, which in the case of Iran during the Shah's actual removal was perhaps a reasonable tactic.随着认为counterresponse一种存在着试图等同于即时的情况偶尔愚蠢的一对伊斯兰教或其他伊斯兰国家，这在伊朗问题在巴列维国王的实际搬迁也许是一个合理的策略。 But after that exuberant period and during the hostage crisis, the tactic has become a somewhat trickier business.但之后，旺盛的时期，并在人质危机，这样的策略已经成为一个比较棘手的业务。 What is the Islamic apologist to say when confronted with the daily count of people executed by the Islamic komitehs, or when — as was reported on September 19, 1979, by Reuters — Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini announces that enemies of the Islamic revolution would be destroyed?什么是伊斯兰辩护说，与由伊斯兰komitehs，或执行时遇到的人每天计数 - 作为9月19日报道，1979年，路透社 - 霍梅尼宣布，伊朗伊斯兰革命的敌人会被销毁？ The point is that both media meanings of “Islam” depend on each other, and are equally to be rejected for perpetuating the double bind.问题是，无论媒体意义的“伊斯兰”相互依存，并同样为永久的双重约束拒绝。

How fundamentally narrow and constricted is the semantic field of Islam was brought home to me after my book Orientalism appeared last year.如何从根本上缩小与收缩是伊斯兰教的语义场是带回家给我过我的书东方去年出现。 Even though I took great pains in the book to show that current discussions of the Orient or of the Arabs and Islam are fundamentally premised upon a fiction, my book was often interpreted as a defense of the “real” Islam.即使我在书中着力表明，东方或阿拉伯人和伊斯兰教目前的讨论后，基本上是一个虚构的前提，我的书，往往解释为“真正的”伊斯兰辩护。 Whereas what I was trying to show was that any talk about Islam was radically flawed, not only because an unwarranted assumption was being made that a large ideologically freighted generalization could cover all the rich and diverse particularity of Islamic life (a very different thing) but also because it would simply be repeating the errors of Orientalism to claim that the correct view of Islam was X or Y or Z. And still I would receive invitations from various institutions to give a lecture on the true meaning of an Islamic Republic or on the Islamic view of peace.虽然我是想表明的是，任何有关伊斯兰教的交谈根本上有缺陷的，这不仅是因为一个不必要的假设被提出，大型思想上被装载的推广可以涵盖所有的伊斯兰宗教生活的丰富多样的特殊性（一个非常不同的东西），但还因为它很简单，重复的东方学的错误声称伊斯兰为X或Y或Z而且，我仍然会收到来自不同机构的邀请，令读者对一个伊斯兰共和国或演讲的真正含义正确看待伊斯兰的和平观。 Either one found oneself defending Islam–as if the religion needed that kind of defense–or, by keeping silent, seeming to be tacitly accepting Islam's defamation.任何一个符合自己捍卫伊斯兰教的宗教需要，好像是种防御，或通过保持沉默，似乎是默默地接受伊斯兰教的诽谤。

But rejection alone does not take one very far, since if we are to claim, as we must, that as a religion and as a civilization Islam does have a meaning very much beyond either of the two currently given it, we must first be able to provide something in the way of a space in which to speak of Islam.但是，拒绝本身并不需要一个很远，因为如果我们要求，我们必须作为一个宗教和伊斯兰教作为一种文明的含义做了非常超越了目前两个可能已给它，我们必须首先能够提供了一个空间来谈论一些伊斯兰教的方式。 Those who wish either to rebut the standard anti-Islamic and anti-Arab rhetoric that dominates the media and liberal intellectual discourse, or to avoid the idealization of Islam (to say nothing of its sentimentalization), find themselves with scarcely a place to stand on, much less a place in which to move freely.这些谁也不想反驳标准反伊斯兰和反阿拉伯的言论占主导地位的媒体和自由知识分子的话语，或避免伊斯兰理想化（更不要说其sentimentalization一无所获），几乎没有一个地方找到自己的立场上，更不用说在其中一个地方自由移动。

From at least the end of the eighteenth century until our own day, modern Occidental reactions to Islam have been dominated by a type of thinking that may still be called Orientalist.至少是从18世纪末到我们自己的一天，现代西方的反应是由伊斯兰教的思维可能仍然被称为东方型为主。 The general basis of Orientalist thought is an imaginative geography dividing the word into two unequal parts, the larger and “different” one called the Orient, the other, also known as our world, called the Occident or the West.一般基础的东方思想是一个富有想象力的地理划分成两部分不平等的，更大和“不同”一个名为东方，另一方面，也为我们的世界知名称为西方或西方，这个词。 Such divisions always take place when one society or culture thinks about another one, different from it, but it is interesting that even when the Orient has uniformly been considered an inferior part of the world, it has always been endowed both with far greater size and with a greater potential for power than the West.这些部门往往发生当一个社会或文化对另一种认为，从它不同，但有趣的是，即使东方已被一致认为是世界下的一部分，它一直被赋予了更大的规模都远远一个比西方权力更大的潜力。 Insofar as Islam has always been seen as belonging to the Orient, its particular fate within the general structure of Orientalism has been to be looked at with a very special hostility and fear.至于伊斯兰教一向被视为属于东方，其在东方的一般结构的特殊命运，一直是看着一个非常特殊的敌意和恐惧。 There are, of course, many obvious religious, psychological and political reasons for this, but all of these reasons derive from a sense that so far as the West is concerned, Islam represents not only a formidable competitor but also a late-coming challenge to当然有，很多明显的宗教，心理和政治方面的原因，但这些原因都源于一种感觉，只要西方而言，伊斯兰教不仅代表一个强大的竞争对手，但也是一个迟来的挑战 Christianity基督教 . 。

I have not been able to discover any period in European or American我没有发现任何能在欧洲或美国期间 history历史 since the Middle Ages in which Islam was generally discussed or thought about outside a framework created by passion, prejudice and political interests.自中世纪伊斯兰教在一般讨论或通过有关境外激情创造了一个框架，偏见和政治利益思想。 This may not seem like a surprising discovery, but included in the indictment is the entire gamut of scholarly and scientific disciplines which, since the early nineteenth century, have either called themselves Orientalism or tried systematically to deal with the Orient.这可能似乎不是一个惊人的发现，但在起诉书包括以学术和科学的，19世纪初以来，要么称自己为东方或试图系统地处理整个东方学科门类齐全。 No one would disagree with the statement that early commentators on Islam like Peter the Venerable and Barthelemy D'Herbelot were passionate Christianpolemicists in what they they said.没有人会不同意的声明，关于伊斯兰早期评论人士喜欢彼得法师和圣巴泰勒米德埃贝洛在他们热情Christianpolemicists他们说什么。 But it has been an unexamined assumption that since Europe advanced into the modern scientific age and freed itself of superstition and ignorance, the march must have included Orientalism.但它一直是未经审查的假设认为，由于欧洲的现代科学进军年龄和摆脱迷信和无知本身，游行必须有包括东方。 Wasn't it true that Silvestre de Sacy, Edward Lane, Ernest Renan, Hamilton Gibb and Louis Massignon were learned, objective scholars, and isn't it true that, following upon all sorts of advances in twentieth-century sociology, anthropology, linguistics and history, American scholars who teach the Middle East and Islam in places like Princeton, Harvard and Chicago are therefore unbiased and free of special pleading in what they do?是不是真的西尔维斯特德萨西，爱德华巷，Ernest Renan对汉密尔顿吉勃和路易马西尼翁了教训，客观的学者，是不是真的，当在20世纪社会学，人类学，语言学的进步以下各类和历史，谁教像普林斯顿地方的中东和伊斯兰美国学者，哈佛和芝加哥，因此特别在公正，他们做了什么恳求免费的吗？ The answer is no.答案是否定的。 Not that Orientalism is more biased than other social and humanistic sciences; it is as ideological and as contaminated by the world as other disciplines.这并不是说东方比其他更偏向社会和人文科学，它是为思想和其他学科，作为世界上污染。 The main difference is that the Orientalists use the authority of their standing as experts to deny–no, to cover–their deep-seated feelings about Islam with a carpet of jargon whose purpose is to certify their “objectivity” and “scientific impartiality.”主要的区别是，东方学家来掩盖其深层次的感情与对伊斯兰教的一个术语，其目的是证明他们的“客观”和“科学公正地毯他们作为专家否认，没有常设机关。”

That is one point.这是一点。 The other distinguishes a historical pattern in what would otherwise be an undifferentiated characterization of Orientalism.另外一个与众不同的历史模式是什么，否则东方未分化的表征。 Whenever in modern times there has been an acutely political tension felt between the Occident and its Orient (or between the West and its Islam), there has been a tendency to resort in the West not to direct violence but first to the cool, relatively detached instruments of scientific, quasi-objective representation.每当在近代出现了剧烈的政治紧张局势感到其与西方和东方（或西方之间的伊斯兰教），有一种倾向，在西方不诉诸直接的暴力行为，但首先要凉爽，相对超脱科学仪器，准客观的代表性。 In this way Islam is made more clear, the true nature of its threat appears, an implicit course of action against it is proposed.在这个伊斯兰教是更加明确，其威胁的真实面目呈现方式，一人反对的行动，提出了隐性课程。 In such a context both science and direct violence end up by being forms of aggression against Islam.在这种情况下双方结束暴力的科学和直接由反对伊斯兰教被侵略形式。

Two strikingly similar examples illustrate my thesis.两个惊人的类似的例子说明我的论文。 We can now see retrospectively that during the nineteenth century both France and England preceded their occupations of portions of the Islamic East with a period in which the various scholarly means of characterizing and understanding the Orient underwent remarkable technical modernization and development.现在，我们可以看到，在回顾19世纪的法国和英国之前，同一个时期，在刻画和理解的方式接受了东方的各种学术卓越的技术现代化和发展伊斯兰东部分的职业。 The French occupation of Algeria in 1830 followed a period of about two decades during which French scholars literally transformed the study of the Orient from an antiquarian into a rational discipline.阿尔及利亚在1830年法国占领后约20年期间，法国学者从一个古物字面转化成一个理性的纪律东方研究期间。 Of course there had been Napoleon Bonaparte's occupation of Egypt in 1798, and of course one should remark the fact that he had prepared for his expedition by marshaling a sophisticated group of scientists to make his enterprise more efficient.当然，出现了拿破仑波拿巴在1798年占领埃及，当然应该句话是他编写了先进的封送一组科学家为他的远征，使他的企业更有效率。 My point, however, is that Napoleon's short-lived occupation of Egypt closed a chapter.我的观点，但是，是拿破仑的短暂占领埃及封闭一章。 A new one began with the long period during which, under de Sacy's stewardship at French institutions of Oriental study, France became the world leader in Orientalism; this chapter climaxed a little later when French armies occupied Algiers in 1830.一个新的时期，而根据德萨西的长期在东方管理研究机构法国开始，法国成为了东方世界的领导者，这一点章高潮后，当1830年法国军队占领阿尔及尔。

I do not at all want to suggest that there is a causal relationship between one thing and the other, nor to adopt the anti-intellectual view that all scientific learning necessarily leads to violence and suffering.我并不想表明，两者之间是有一点与其他因果关系，也没有采取反智认为，所有科学的学习一定会导致暴力和苦难。 All I want to say is that empires are not spontaneously born, nor during the modern period have they been run by improvisation.我只想说的是，帝国不是自发地出生，也有现代的过程中，他们被即兴运行。 If the development of learning involves the redefinition and the reconstitution of fields of human experience by scientists who stand above the material they study, it is not impertinent to see the same development occurring among politicians whose realm of authority is redefined to include inferior regions of the world where new “national” interests can be discovered, and later seen to be in need of close supervision.如果学习的发展，涉及重新界定和对科学家谁上述立场的材料，他们研究人类经验领域的重组，它不是鲁莽地看到同样的发展政治家的权力领域是重新定义，以包括区域发生的劣势世界上新的“国家利益”可以被发现，后来看到是在严密监管的需要。 I very much doubt that England would have occupied Egypt in so long and massively institutionalized a way were it not for the durable investment in Oriental learning first cultivated by scholars like Lane and William James.我很怀疑，英国将在这样一个制度化的长期和大规模的方式占领埃及，如果不是在第一次由像里及栽培东方学者威廉詹姆斯学习持久的投资。 Familiarly, accessibility, representability: these were what Orientalists demonstrated about the Orient.亲密，交通方便，可表示：这些都是什么东方学家对东方的证明。 The Orient could be seen, it could be studied, it could be managed.东方可以看到，它可以研究的，它可以进行管理。 It need not remain a distant, marvelous, incomprehensible and yet very rich place.它不需要仍然是一个遥远的，奇妙的，难以理解的地方，却非常丰富。 It could be brought home–or, more simply, Europe could make itself at home there, as it subsequently did.它可以带回家，或者更简单地说，欧洲有可能使自己在家里，因为它后来没有。

My second example is a contemporary one.我的第二个例子是当代的。 The Islamic Orient today is important for its resources or for its geopolitical location.伊斯兰东方今天是很重要的资源或其地缘政治位置。 Neither of these, however, is interchangeable with the interests, needs or aspirations of the native Orientals.这些都不是，但是，与利益，需要或愿望的本土东方人互换。 Ever since the end of World War II, the United States has been taking positions of dominance and hegemony once held in the Islamic world by Britain and France.自从第二次世界大战结束，美国一直在采取一次是在伊斯兰世界的英国和法国举行的主导地位和霸权地位。 With this replacement of one imperial system by another have gone two things: first, a remarkable burgeoning of academic and expert interest in Islam, and, second, an extraordinary revolution in the techniques available to the largely private-sector press and electronic journalism industries.在这样的一个帝国制度的另一家走了两件事情：首先更换，一个了不起的新兴学科和专家在伊斯兰教的兴趣，第二，在该技术主要是提供给私营部门的新闻媒体和电子行业的非凡的革命。 Together these two phenomena, by which a huge apparatus of university, government and business experts study Islam and the Middle East and by which Islam has become a subject familiar to every consumer of news in the West, have almost entirely domesticated the Islamic world.连同这两个现象，其中一个巨大的仪器大学，政府和企业的专家研究伊斯兰教与中东和伊斯兰教已成为每一个熟悉的一个主题的新闻在西方消费者，几乎完全驯化的伊斯兰世界。 Not only has that world become the subject of the most profound cultural and economic Western saturation in history–for no non-Western realm has been so dominated by the United States as the Arab-Islamic world is dominated today–by the exchange between Islam and the West, in this case the United States, is profoundly one-sided.这不但成为世界上最深刻的历史文化和经济为没有非西方的领域是如此，作为阿拉伯和伊斯兰世界的主宰是美国主导的西方饱和今天的题目由伊斯兰教与交流在这种情况下，美国西部，是深刻的片面。

So far as the United States seems to be concerned, it is only a slight overstatement to say that Moslems and Arabs are essentially seen as either oil suppliers or potential terrorists.至于美国似乎担心，这只是一个轻微的夸张地说，穆斯林和阿拉伯人基本上划为石油供应商或潜在的恐怖分子看到。 Very little of the detail, the human density, the passion of Arab-Moslem life has entered the awareness of even those people whose profession it is to report the Arab world.非常小的细节，人的密度，使得阿拉伯穆斯林生活的热情，甚至已经进入了这些人的专业报告是阿拉伯世界的认识。 What we have instead is a series of crude, essentialized caricatures of the Islamic world presented in such a way as to make that world vulnerable to military aggression.我们所的却是原油，伊斯兰世界的本质化的漫画系列以这样一种方式呈现，以使这一世界脆弱的军事侵略。 I do not think it is an accident, therefore, that recent talk of US military intervention in the Arabian Gulf (which began at least five years ago, well before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) has been preceded by a long period of Islam's rational presentation through the cool medium of television and through “objective” Orientalist study: in many ways our actual situation today bears a chilling resemblance to the nineteenth-century British and French examples previously cited.我不认为这是一起事故，因此，美国的军事干预在阿拉伯海湾（其中至少5年以前开始最近的谈话，以及前苏联对阿富汗的入侵）已由一对伊斯兰教的理性介绍长时间之前通过电视冷媒介，通过“客观”东方学研究：在我们的实际情况，今天很多方面值得一冷更像19世纪的英国和法国的例子，以前引用。

Even if military aggression does not occur, the implications of all this are far-reaching.即使不发生军事侵略，这一切的影响是深远的。 As mentioned earlier, Islam has uniformly appeared to Europe and the West in general as a threat.如前所述，伊斯兰教似乎欧洲统一和一般西方是一个威胁。 Today, the phenomenon is more in evidence than ever before because on the one hand there has been an enormous media convergence upon what has been called the emergence, return or resurgence of Islam, and on the other hand, because parts of the Islamic world–Palestine, Iran, Afghanistan, among other places–which have been undergoing various unequal processes of historical development, have also seemed to be encroaching upon traditional Western (more particularly American) hegemony.今天，这一现象比以往任何时候都因为一方面证据越多后，已被称为什么出现一个巨大的媒体衔接，退回或伊斯兰复兴，并在另一方面，由于部分伊斯兰世界巴勒斯坦，伊朗，阿富汗等地，已处于历史发展的各种不平等的进程，也似乎是在传统的西方（特别是美国的）霸权侵犯。 The views of the experts and of the media are nearly identical on this.专家们的意见和媒体几乎是一致的这一点。 Far from attempting to refine, or even dissent from, the gross image of Islam as a threat, the intellectual and policy community in the United States has considerably enforced and concentrated the image.从试图加以改进，甚至异议的，作为一个威胁，智力和政策在美国社会中的伊斯兰教的形象至今相当严重，集中执行的形象。 From Zbigniew Brzezinski's vision of the “crescent of crisis” to Bernard Lewis's “return of Islam,” the picture drawn is a unanimous one.从布热津斯基的危机“新月”的眼光伯纳德刘易斯的“伊斯兰的回归”，那幅画是一致的。 “Islam” means the end of civilization as “we” know it. “伊斯兰”是指文明的“我们”知道它的结束。 Islam is anti-human, antidemocratic, anti-Semitic, antirational.伊斯兰教是反人性，反民主，反犹太人，反理性的。 University scholars whose professional lives are tied to the study of Islam have either been willing collaborators with this state of things, or if they have been silent, their marginality in the culture at large further confirms the fact that in the United States at least, there is no major segment of the polity, no significant sector of the culture, no part of the whole community capable of identifying sympathetically with the Islamic world.大学学者的专业都与伊斯兰教的学习生活已经被这个国家的东西，或者如果他们愿意一直沉默的合作者，在其边缘文化的大进一步证实了事实是，在美国至少有没有政体的主要部分，没有文化重要的部门，没有整个社会的一部分，识别与伊斯兰世界的同情能力。

On the other hand, most of the Third World is now fully bathed in US-produced TV shows, and is wholly dependent upon a tiny group of news agencies that transmit news back to the Third World, even in the large numbers of cases where the news is about the Third World.另一方面，第三世界的，是目前最全面的美电视节目制作的沐浴，是完全建立在对新闻机构的一小撮依赖的传播新闻回第三世界，甚至在大量的个案如新闻是关于第三世界。 From being the source of news, the Third World generally, and Islamic countries in particular, have become consumers of news.从目前的消息来源，第三世界普遍，和伊斯兰国家，特别是已成为新闻的消费者。 For the first time in history (for the first time, that is, on such a scale) the Islamic world may be said to be learning about itself in part by means of images, histories and information manufactured in the West.在历史上首次为第一次（即，在这样一个规模），伊斯兰世界可能会说是学习的一部分是关于自身的形象，是指在西方历史和制造信息。 If one adds to this fact that students and scholars in the Islamic world are still dependent upon US and European libraries and institutions of learning for what now passes as Middle Eastern studies (consider, for example, that there isn'ta single first-rate, usable library of Arabic material in the entire Islamic world), plus the fact that English is a world language in a way that Arabic isn't, plus the fact that for its elite the Islamic world is now producing a managerial class of basically subordinate natives who are indebted for their economies, their defense establishments and for their political ideas to the worldwide consumer-market system controlled in the West–one gets an accurate, although extremely depressing, picture of what the media revolution (serving a small segment of the societies that produced it) has done to Islam.如果加上了这一点，学生和学者在伊斯兰世界仍然在美国和欧洲的依赖库和现在的东西作为中东研究（考虑例如，通过学习机构，不是一个单一的，有一流的，图书馆阿拉伯语材料可用在整个伊斯兰世界），加上英文是一个的方式，阿拉伯语是不是世界语言，加上事实，即它的精英伊斯兰世界目前生产的基本下属当地人管理阶层谁是他们的经济负债累累，其国防机构以及向全球消费市场体系在西方，一个控制他们的政治主张得到一个准确的，虽然非常沮丧，图片什么的媒体革命（服务一小部分的社会它的产生）做了伊斯兰教。

To the extent that Islam is known about today, it is known principally in the form given it by the mass media: not only radio, films and Tv but also textbooks, magazines and best-selling, high-quality novels.到今天，伊斯兰教是众所周知的程度，它是已知的形式主要是通过大众传播媒介给予：不只是广播，电影和电视，但也课本，杂志和最畅销的，高品质的小说了。 This corporate picture of Islam on the whole is a depressing and misleading one.这对整个伊斯兰企业图片是一个令人沮丧和误导之一。 What emerges is that Ayatollah Khomeini, Col. Muammar e-Qaddafi, Sheik Ahmad Zaki Yamani and Palestinian terrorists are the best-known figures in the foreground, while the background is populated by shadowy (though extremely frightening) notions about jihad, slavery, subordination of women and irrational violence combined with extreme licentiousness.出现的是什么霍梅尼，卡扎菲上校电子卡扎菲，谢赫艾哈迈德扎基亚马尼和巴勒斯坦恐怖分子在前台最知名的人物，而背景是模糊的（虽然非常可怕的）人口约圣战的概念，奴役，从属对妇女的暴力行为和非理性的极端淫结合。 If you were to ask an average literate Westerner to name an Arab or Islamic writer, or a musician, or an intellectual, you might get a name like Kahlil Gibran in response, but nothing else.如果你问一个西方人的名字平均识字的阿拉伯或伊斯兰作家，音乐家，还是一个知识分子，你可能会得到这样的卡希尔在回应纪伯伦的名字，但仅此而已。 In other words, whole swatches of Islamic history, culture and society simply do not exist except in the truncated, tightly packaged forms made current by the media.换句话说，整个殡仪馆的伊斯兰历史，文化和社会根本不存在，除非被截断，紧紧包装形式由媒体电流。 As Herbert Schiller has said, TV's images tend to present reality in too immediate and fragmentary a form for either historical or human continuity to appear.正如赫伯特席勒说，电视的图像往往出示任何历史或现实中人类的连续性也立即和零碎的形式出现。 Islam therefore is equivalent to an undifferentiated mob of scimitar-waving oil suppliers, or it is reduced to the utterances of one or another Islamic leader who at the moment happens to be a convenient foreign scapegoat.因此，伊斯兰教是相当于一个弯刀，挥舞着石油供应商，或者是减少到未分化的话语暴民一个或另一个伊斯兰领导人谁此刻正好是一个方便外国替罪羊。

We are well past the point of being able to say whether the media or the experts or the governments or the mass audiences are to blame for this state of affairs.我们早已过了能够说明是否传媒或专家或政府或集体的观众都应该为此负责的事务的状态点。 With very few exceptions, one is struck by the blinding uniformity of the picture.除极少数例外，一个是深刻的画面的均匀性致盲。 Perhaps it is true that the state of information that now exists on any subject is as standardized, and as low, as this one; and perhaps also it is true that whatever the experts, the special-interest groups, the manipulators touch they turn into flatness, ignorance and stereotypes.也许这是事实的信息，现在就任何事项存在状态是规范化，低，因为这一个，或许也因为如此，无论是专家，特殊利益集团，他们把触摸的操控成平整度，无知和偏见。 But we must be especially alarmed that whether Islam is depicted on television, or whether it turns up in school textbooks, or whether it appears in best-selling novels by high-class novelists, or whether it's learnedly discussed by an academic expert on Islam (who is still respected in parts of the Arab world), the picture is almost exactly the same.但是，我们必须特别警惕，无论伊斯兰教是描绘在电视上，还是原来在学校的教科书，还是在最畅销的小说出现了高档的小说家，还是它的learnedly由一对伊斯兰教学者专家讨论（谁仍然是在阿拉伯世界各地尊重），图片几乎是一模一样的。 That does not mean that the picture is an inaccurate one; rather, it is a picture; it has the consistency of something made up, not of life; it portrays certain aspects of what Marshall Hodges has called the Islamicate world, but deforms them into a pattern that expresses certain things about a mass-media society, very little about what is referred to as Islam.这并不意味着该图片是不准确的;相反，它是一个图片，它已经取得了某些东西的一致性，生活不，它描绘了什么马歇尔霍奇斯称之为Islamicate世界的某些方面，但他们到变形一个模式，表达对一个大众媒体社会的某些事情，非常关心什么被称为伊斯兰教不大。 What is crucially important about this presentation of Islam is the media's ascendancy, their intellectual and perceptual hegemony, over the whole thing, and since the media sell their product to consumers who prefer simplicity to complexity, the uniform image of Islam that emerges is constructed out of much the same material from which history, society and humanity have been eliminated.什么是关键这个伊斯兰介绍重要的是媒体的优势，他们的智力和感性霸权整个事情，而且由于媒体出售他们的产品给消费者谁更喜欢简单到复杂，伊斯兰浮现的是构建出统一的形象有同样的物质的历史，社会和人类已被淘汰。

What can be done?什么可以做什么？ To begin with, what should be avoided is an attempt to alter, improve, beautify, make more appealing the image of Islam.首先，什么是应该避免试图改变，改善，美化，使更具吸引力的伊斯兰形象。 Such an effort falls into the trap of believing that reductive images can be made substitutes for a very complex reality, and it ends up perpetuating the entire system of ideological fictions by which Islam is made to do service for Western designs upon riches, peoples and territories that happen to call themselves Moslem.这样的努力陷入了一个非常复杂的相信现实，还原图像，可替代陷阱，它结束了长期存在的，其中伊斯兰教是向西方的财富后，做设计服务，人民和领土的思想小说整个系统这种情况发生，自称穆斯林。 A hard and fast distinction has to be made between serious consideration of the Islamicate world and nearly everything that passes for Islam in the media and in all but a few places in the culture.一个硬性的区别是Islamicate之间的几乎所有世界和传递，为伊斯兰教在媒体和所有的文化，但在少数地方认真考虑的。 One cannot look for help in promoting serious investigative discussion of Islam–even as a subject of academic inquiry–among traditional Orientalists or within the normally constructed programs of Middle Eastern studies in today's Western universities.我们不能期待在认真调查的讨论促进伊斯兰教的帮助，甚至作为一个学科的学术调查，在传统东方或在中东在今天的西方大学的研究通常建造方案。 On the other hand, younger scholars and students can be extremely useful in carrying work beyond prejudices and constrictions of their elders.另一方面，年轻学者和学生可以在执行非常有用超越偏见和他们的长辈缢工作。 And, just as important, a serious interest in the problems of Islamic society and Islamic peoples is very likely to develop not among the Middle East experts, or media people who have a purported specialty in modern Islam, but inside segments of the population who have a wider and more serious view of human problems in general: men and women who are committed not to Orient and Occident but to the cause of human rights, rather than lobbyists who act on behalf of human rights when they are paid to do so; students of comparative literature rather than Semitic philologists who know nothing about other literatures and who care little for the contemporary world; genuinely enterprising sociologists who know something about theory and care a great deal about issues confronting concrete societies, rather than specialists in the Islamic mind or in a monolithic thing called Islamic society.而且，同样重要的是，在伊斯兰社会和伊斯兰人民的利益的严重问题很可能是发展国际间的中东问题专家，谁拥有人或媒体在现代伊斯兰的本意是不专业，但谁的人口段内有在一般人的更广泛和更严重的问题的看法：男人，谁是承诺不向东方和西方，而是对人权事业，而不是对谁当说客，他们这样做是支付名义行事的人权，妇女，学生谁知道，而不是对其他文献，谁没有犹太人的语言学家比较文学关心当今世界不大;真正谁知道一些理论和关怀，而不是有关专家面临的具体社会问题很多，在伊斯兰思想或进取社会学家铁板一块的东西所谓的伊斯兰社会。 Whatever the person, whatever the field of endeavor, I doubt that there can be any substitute for a genuinely engaged and sympathetic–as opposed to a narrowly political or hostile–attitude to the Islamic world.不管是什么人，不论领域的努力，我怀疑有任何可以替代真正的参与和同情，而不是狭隘的政治或敌意的态度，伊斯兰世界。 Indeed, I suspect that only if we get beyond politicized labels like “East” and “West” will we be able to reach the real world at all.事实上，我怀疑，只是如果我们以后像“东方”和“西方”政治标签，让我们才能够实现与现实世界的。

As for what the Islamic, and more especially the Arab-Islamic, world might do, this can be put very simply.至于什么是伊斯兰，更特别是阿拉伯，伊斯兰，世界可以做，可以把这个非常简单。 There is no longer any excuse for bewailing the hostility of the “West” toward the Arabs and Islam and then sitting back in outraged righteousness.不再有任何怨声载道的“西方”对阿拉伯人和伊斯兰教的敌意借口，然后坐在愤怒义回来。 When the reasons for this hostility and those aspects of the “West” that encourage it are analyzed, an important step has been taken toward fighting it, but that is by no means the whole way.当这种敌对的原因和那些方面的“西”，鼓励它进行了分析，一个重要的步骤已经迈出争取它，但并不意味着整个正在进行。 Certainly there are great dangers today in actually following, actually fulfilling this hostile image of Islam–and that has only been the doing, it is true, of some Moslems and some Arabs and some black Africans.当然有很大的危险，其实下面的今天，其实实现这一敌对形象伊斯兰教，而只是一直是这样做，这是事实的一些穆斯林和阿拉伯人和一些非洲黑人。 But such fulfillments underline the importance of what still has to be done.但是，这种fulfillments突出了还有什么要做的重要性。 In the great rush to industrialize, modernize and develop itself, the Islamicate world has been compliant about turning itself into a great consumers' market.在伟大急于实现工业化，现代化和发展自己，世界一直在Islamicate兼容，变成一个伟大的消费者市场。 To dispel the myths and stereotypes of Orientalism, the world as a whole has to be given an opportunity to see Moslems and Orientals producing a different form of history, a new kind of sociology, a new cultural awareness: in short, the relatively modest goal of writing a new form of history, investigating the Islamicate world and its many different societies with a genuine seriousness of purpose and a love of truth.为了消除误解和成见的东方，整个世界必须有机会看到穆斯林和东方人产生不同的历史形式，一个新的社会学，一种新的文化意识：总之，相对温和的目标编写一个新的历史形式，调查的目的有一个真正的严肃性和真理的爱Islamicate世界和它的许多不同的社会。 But, alas, we must recognize that even with vast sums of money easily available, the Islamic world as a whole does not seem interested in promoting learning, building libraries, establishing research institutes whose main purpose would be modern scientific attention to Islamic realities and to seeing whether in fact there is something specifically Islamic about the Islamic world.但是，唉，我们必须承认，即使巨额资金容易获得，整个伊斯兰世界似乎并不在促进学习兴趣，建立图书馆，建立研究机构，其主要目的是现代科学的重视和伊斯兰的现实其实，看看是否有什么特别是关于伊斯兰世界伊斯兰。

Why is there a rush to produce row upon row of functionally illiterate technicians–with each new generation more likely than its predecessors to be vulnerable to the media revolution in its worst excesses?为什么会出现急于出示一排排的半文盲技术人员与每个新的一代更比它的前任很可能将在其最恶劣的暴行容易受到媒体的革命呢？ This is the great question of the hour.这是一小时大问题。 If it is a fact that this is the general direction taken by the Third World countries that have recently gained their independence, it isn't much of a consolation to say confidently that the problem is not an Islamic one but a social and cultural one.如果这是事实，这是大方向由第三世界国家最近已获得了独立，这不是什么安慰说自信地说，问题不是一个，而是一个伊斯兰社会和文化之一。 Nor is the rhetorical attack upon neo-imperialism very convincing at a time when national governments and rulers openly espouse values that further the new style of imperialism without colonies.也不是在新帝国主义的进攻非常修辞时各国政府和统治者公开信奉的价值观，进一步说服新的帝国主义作风没有殖民地。 To say that this reflects a preoccupation with rhetoric and style at the expense of concrete substance is, however, not to have learned anything from what we have been calling the distortion of the Arab-Islamic image in the Western media.如果说，这反映了与修辞和风格在具体内容为代价的当务之急是，但是，不知道从什么我们都一直在呼吁西方媒体对阿拉伯和伊斯兰的任何图像失真。 That this distortion has occurred at all is a function of power, and in this instance style and image are direct political indices of power.这在所有已发生扭曲，是一种权力的作用，在这种情况下作风和形象是直接的政治权力的指标。 Thus, we must concede that any drastic attempt to correct distortions of Islam and the Arabs is a political question involving the use and deployment of power.因此，我们必须承认，任何急剧的企图纠正歪曲伊斯兰教的阿拉伯人是一个政治问题，涉及权力的使用和部署。

Let me return to the power of the media in the current situation involving Islam.让我回到了在当前形势下，涉及伊斯兰媒体的力量。 As the press comes to perceive an increasing number of Moslems as American enemies, rulers like Egypt's President Anwar el-Sadat (whose remark that Khomeini was a lunatic and a disgrace to Islam was repeated ad nauseam) have been made to seem like a more desirable Islamic norm.由于记者来到认为是因为美国的敌人穆斯林越来越多，统治者像埃及总统萨达特（他说，在霍梅尼是一个疯子，是对伊斯兰教的耻辱重复生厌）已作出看起来像是一个更可取伊斯兰规范。 The same is true of the Saudi royal family, although what generally goes unreported as a result is a considerable amount of disturbing information and, in the case of Iran, this deepens the hostage crisis.同样是沙特皇室如此，尽管一般去隐瞒什么，结果是一个令人不安的大量资料，并在伊朗的情况下，这加深了人质危机。

Since the Camp David agreements of 1978 there has been a consensus that Sadat is our friend in the region; along with Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel he has been openly proclaiming his willingness to become a regional policeman and to give the United States bases on his territory.自1978年戴维营出现了一个共识，就是萨达特是我们在该地区的朋友，随着总理贝京以色列，他一直公开宣称，他愿意成为一个地区警察，并给予美国依据其协定领土。 As a consequence, nearly everything reported out of Egypt effectively makes his point of view seem like the correct one on matters Egyptian, Arab and regional.因此，几乎所有报出埃及有效地使他的观点似乎是正确的事项之一的埃及，阿拉伯和地区。 Egypt and the Arab world, in fact, now often reported with a view to confirming Sadat's pre-eminence; little appears about the widespread opposition to him.埃及和阿拉伯世界，事实上，现在经常报道，以确认萨达特的重要地位，小appears对他的普遍反对。 Exactly the same thing happened during the Pahlevi regime, of course, when, with the exception of Berkeley scholar Hamid Algar, no one paid the slightest attention to the potential of the Shah's religious and political opposition.正是同样的事情发生在巴列维政权，当然，时，在伯克利学者哈米德阿尔加例外，没有人稍为重视对巴列维国王的宗教和政治反对派的潜力。 Many of our political, military, strategic and economic investments today are made through Sadat, and by virtue of Sadat's perspective on things.我们的许多政治，军事，战略和经济投资，今天通过萨达特，萨达特和对事物的角度美德。

There are other reasons too.也有其他原因。 One is the Middle East's sensitive domestic aspects for this country.一个是中东地区的敏感，这个国家的国内问题方面。 It is no accident, for example, that even after Watergate and the revelations about the Central Intelligence Agency (and even with the Freedom of Information Act), there have been no major discoveries concerning US activities in the Middle East.这不是意外，例如，水门事件后，即使和有关中央情报局（甚至与信息自由法的启示），有没有关于美国在中东活动的重大发现。 This is surprising in the case of Iran, not simply because so many Americans were on the take from the Shah but also because of Israel's extremely close involvement with the United States there under the ex-Shah's regime.这是在伊朗的情况下，不只是令人惊讶，因为这么多的美国人对从伊朗国王，但也因为以色列极为密切同美国的参与下，前巴列维国王政权的存在。 Savak was set up with the direct help of the Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, and, as in so many other cases, the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation cooperated willingly with the Israeli secret services.萨瓦克成立与摩萨德，以色列情报机构，直接帮助，并在许多其他情况下，美国中央情报局和联邦调查局合作，愿意与以色列秘密服务。

In addition, there is an increasingly influential new lobby in this country whose main function is to assure the US public that the present Arab regimes in the Gulf are stable.此外，还有一个在这个国家越来越有影响，其主要职能是保证，目前在海湾阿拉伯政权稳定美国公众新的大堂。 Among all the reporters for the major networks and newspapers, in fact, only CBS's Ed Bradley noted on November 24, 1979, that all information about the November occupation of the Great Mosque in Mecca came from the Government and that no other news was permitted.在所有的主要网络和报纸，其实，记者中，只有哥伦比亚广播公司的埃德布拉德利指出，11月24日，1979年，所有有关大清真寺11月在麦加从事职业的资料来自于政府的，没有其他消息是允许的。 Subsequently, The Christian Science Monitor's Helena Cobban reported from Beirut on November 30 that the mosque's seizure had a very definite political meaning, that far from being Islamic fanatics, the attackers were part of a political network having a secular as well as an Islamic program, pointedly directed at the political and financial monopoly held by the Saudi royal family.后来，基督教科学箴言报的海伦娜科贝恩报道贝鲁特11月30日，该清真寺的发作有一个非常明确的政治含义，这远远不是伊斯兰狂热分子，袭击者是政治有作为伊斯兰方案世俗以及网络的一部分，尖锐地针对由沙特阿拉伯王室举行的政治和金融的垄断。 One month after her article appeared, the Saudi spokesman for the group, who had given Cobban the story, was picked up off a Beirut street and has disappeared; Saudi intelligence is reportedly behind the man's abduction.一个月后，她的文章出现，该组的，谁给了沙特发言人科班的故事，是拿起了贝鲁特街头，后失踪;据报道，沙特情报背后的人的绑架。

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we are probably going to have an even more dramatic cleavage separating good Moslems from bad.随着苏联对阿富汗的入侵，我们很可能将会有一个更加戏剧性的裂解分离好坏穆斯林。 We will undoubtedly be seeing ever more news hailing the achievements of good Moslems like Sadat, Pakistan's Zia ul-Haq and the Afghan Moslem insurgents–more equating of good Islam with anti-Communism and, if possible, with modernization.我们无疑将会看到更多的新闻不断欢呼，如萨达特好穆斯林的成就，巴基斯坦齐亚哈克和阿富汗穆斯林叛乱分子，更良好的伊斯兰教等同于反共产主义，如果可能，现代化。 As for Moslems who do not serve our purpose, they will, as always, be portrayed as backward fanatics.至于穆斯林谁不为我所用，他们将一如既往，被描绘成落后的狂热分子。

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