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(We do not neccessarily agree with everything that is said by the author ? Ed. ) （我們不一定同意的一切，是由作者說？版。）

The media have become obsessed with something called “媒體已經成為迷戀一種叫做“ Islam伊斯蘭教 ,” which in their voguish lexicon has acquired only two meanings, both of them unacceptable and impoverishing. “，這在其風行一時的詞彙已經收購了只有兩個意思，雙方都不能接受的，導致貧窮。 On the one hand, “Islam” represents the threat of a resurgent atavism, which suggests not only the menace of a return to the Middle Ages but the destruction of what Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan calls the democratic order in the Western world.一方面，“伊斯蘭”代表威脅復活的返祖現象，這意味著不僅威脅了回到中世紀，但破壞參議員丹尼爾帕特里克莫尼漢呼籲民主秩序的西方世界。 On the other hand, “Islam” is made to stand for a defensive counterresponse to this first image of Islam as threat, especially when, for geopolitical reasons, “good” Moslems like the Saudi Arabians or the Afghan Moslem “freedom fighters” against the Soviet Union are in question.另一方面，“伊斯蘭”是由參選防禦 counterresponse這首形象伊斯蘭教作為威脅，尤其是當對地緣政治原因，“好”穆斯林像沙特或阿富汗穆斯林“自由戰士”對蘇聯的問題。 Anything said in defense of Islam is more or less forced into the apologetic form of a plea for Islam's humanism, its contributions to civilization, development and perhaps even to democratic niceness.在國防所說的話是對伊斯蘭教的或多或少被迫進入一個認罪的道歉形式為伊斯蘭教的人文精神，對文明的貢獻，發展，甚至對民主niceness。

Along with that kind of counterresponse there is the occasional foolishness of trying to equate Islam with the immediate situation of one or another Islamic country, which in the case of Iran during the Shah's actual removal was perhaps a reasonable tactic.隨著該種 counterresponse偶爾有愚蠢的嘗試與伊斯蘭教等同於一個即時的情況或其他伊斯蘭國家，這在案件伊朗在巴列維國王的實際搬遷也許是一個合理的策略。 But after that exuberant period and during the hostage crisis, the tactic has become a somewhat trickier business.但之後，旺盛的時期，並在人質危機，這樣的策略已經成為一個比較棘手的業務。 What is the Islamic apologist to say when confronted with the daily count of people executed by the Islamic komitehs, or when — as was reported on September 19, 1979, by Reuters — Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini announces that enemies of the Islamic revolution would be destroyed?什麼是伊斯蘭的代言人說何時面臨處決的人每天數由伊斯蘭 komitehs，或當 - 為 9月19日報導，1979年，路透社 - 霍梅尼宣布，伊斯蘭革命的敵人會被銷毀？ The point is that both media meanings of “Islam” depend on each other, and are equally to be rejected for perpetuating the double bind.問題是，無論媒體意義的“伊斯蘭”相互依存，並同樣被拒絕延續雙重約束。

How fundamentally narrow and constricted is the semantic field of Islam was brought home to me after my book Orientalism appeared last year.如何從根本上縮小和收縮，是對伊斯蘭教的語義場是帶回家給我過我的書東方去年出現。 Even though I took great pains in the book to show that current discussions of the Orient or of the Arabs and Islam are fundamentally premised upon a fiction, my book was often interpreted as a defense of the “real” Islam.儘管我煞費苦心書中顯示，目前討論的東方或阿拉伯人和伊斯蘭教，根本前提是虛構的，我的書，往往解釋為捍衛“真正的”伊斯蘭教。 Whereas what I was trying to show was that any talk about Islam was radically flawed, not only because an unwarranted assumption was being made that a large ideologically freighted generalization could cover all the rich and diverse particularity of Islamic life (a very different thing) but also because it would simply be repeating the errors of Orientalism to claim that the correct view of Islam was X or Y or Z. And still I would receive invitations from various institutions to give a lecture on the true meaning of an Islamic Republic or on the Islamic view of peace.雖然我是想表明的是，任何談論伊斯蘭教根本缺陷，這不僅是因為一個不必要的假設被提出，大型思想上被裝載的推廣可以涵蓋所有的豐富多樣的特殊性伊斯蘭生活（一個非常不同的東西），但還因為它會簡單地重複錯誤的東方學要求，正確的觀點是對伊斯蘭教的X或Y或Z而且，我仍然會收到來自不同機構的邀請作主題演講的真正意義上的伊斯蘭共和國或在伊斯蘭的和平觀。 Either one found oneself defending Islam–as if the religion needed that kind of defense–or, by keeping silent, seeming to be tacitly accepting Islam's defamation.任何一個符合自己捍衛伊斯蘭教的宗教需要，好像是種防禦，或通過保持沉默，似乎是默默地接受伊斯蘭教的誹謗。

But rejection alone does not take one very far, since if we are to claim, as we must, that as a religion and as a civilization Islam does have a meaning very much beyond either of the two currently given it, we must first be able to provide something in the way of a space in which to speak of Islam.但是，拒絕本身並不需要一個很遠，因為如果我們要求，我們必須作為一個宗教，伊斯蘭文明有其意義遠遠超出非常任兩個目前給它，我們必須首先能夠東西向的方式提供一個空間，談論伊斯蘭教。 Those who wish either to rebut the standard anti-Islamic and anti-Arab rhetoric that dominates the media and liberal intellectual discourse, or to avoid the idealization of Islam (to say nothing of its sentimentalization), find themselves with scarcely a place to stand on, much less a place in which to move freely.這些誰也不想反駁標準反伊斯蘭和反阿拉伯的言論佔主導地位的媒體和自由知識分子的話語，或避免理想化的伊斯蘭教（更不用說其sentimentalization），發現自己幾乎沒有一個地方立場，更不用說在其中一個地方自由移動。

From at least the end of the eighteenth century until our own day, modern Occidental reactions to Islam have been dominated by a type of thinking that may still be called Orientalist.至少從 18世紀結束之前，我們自己的一天，現代西方對伊斯蘭教的反應一直佔主導地位的一個類型的思維可能仍然被稱為東方。 The general basis of Orientalist thought is an imaginative geography dividing the word into two unequal parts, the larger and “different” one called the Orient, the other, also known as our world, called the Occident or the West.一般基礎的東方思想是富有想像力的地理劃分為兩個詞不平等的部分，較大和“不同”一個名為東方，另一方面，也被稱為我們的世界，被稱為西方或西方。 Such divisions always take place when one society or culture thinks about another one, different from it, but it is interesting that even when the Orient has uniformly been considered an inferior part of the world, it has always been endowed both with far greater size and with a greater potential for power than the West.這些部門往往發生當一個社會或文化對另一種認為，不同，但有趣的是，即使已一致被認為是東方劣勢世界的一部分，它一直都被賦予了更大的規模和一個更大的潛在力量比西方。 Insofar as Islam has always been seen as belonging to the Orient, its particular fate within the general structure of Orientalism has been to be looked at with a very special hostility and fear.至於伊斯蘭教一向被視為屬於東方，其特殊的命運，在一般的結構已被東方學研究以一個非常特殊的敵意和恐懼。 There are, of course, many obvious religious, psychological and political reasons for this, but all of these reasons derive from a sense that so far as the West is concerned, Islam represents not only a formidable competitor but also a late-coming challenge to有，當然，有許多明顯的宗教，心理和政治方面的原因，但所有這些原因來自一種感覺，只要西方而言，伊斯蘭教不僅代表一個強大的競爭對手，但也是一個遲來的挑戰 Christianity基督教 . 。

I have not been able to discover any period in European or American我沒有能夠發現任何期間在歐洲或美國 history歷史 since the Middle Ages in which Islam was generally discussed or thought about outside a framework created by passion, prejudice and political interests.自中世紀伊斯蘭教一般在討論或思考的框架以外創造的激情，偏見和政治利益。 This may not seem like a surprising discovery, but included in the indictment is the entire gamut of scholarly and scientific disciplines which, since the early nineteenth century, have either called themselves Orientalism or tried systematically to deal with the Orient.這可能似乎不是一個驚人的發現，但包括在起訴書是整個域的學術和科學學科的，19世紀初以來，要么稱自己為東方或試圖系統地處理世界的東方。 No one would disagree with the statement that early commentators on Islam like Peter the Venerable and Barthelemy D'Herbelot were passionate Christianpolemicists in what they they said.沒有人會不同意他的發言，早期評論家對伊斯蘭教的法師像彼得和聖巴泰勒米德埃貝洛人在他們充滿激情Christianpolemicists他們說。 But it has been an unexamined assumption that since Europe advanced into the modern scientific age and freed itself of superstition and ignorance, the march must have included Orientalism.但它一直是未經審查的假設認為，由於歐洲的現代科學進軍年齡和釋放自己的迷信和愚昧，遊行必須有包括東方。 Wasn't it true that Silvestre de Sacy, Edward Lane, Ernest Renan, Hamilton Gibb and Louis Massignon were learned, objective scholars, and isn't it true that, following upon all sorts of advances in twentieth-century sociology, anthropology, linguistics and history, American scholars who teach the Middle East and Islam in places like Princeton, Harvard and Chicago are therefore unbiased and free of special pleading in what they do?是不是真的西爾維斯特德薩西，愛德華巷，Ernest Renan對漢密爾頓吉勃和路易馬西尼翁了教訓，客觀的學者，是不是真的，下面的各種預付款後，在20世紀的社會學，人類學，語言學與歷史，美國學者誰教和伊斯蘭教在中東地區，如普林斯頓，哈佛和芝加哥是公正和自由的，因此特別懇求他們在做什麼？ The answer is no.答案是否定的。 Not that Orientalism is more biased than other social and humanistic sciences; it is as ideological and as contaminated by the world as other disciplines.這並不是說東方比其他更偏向社會和人文科學，它是思想被污染了世界其他學科。 The main difference is that the Orientalists use the authority of their standing as experts to deny–no, to cover–their deep-seated feelings about Islam with a carpet of jargon whose purpose is to certify their “objectivity” and “scientific impartiality.”主要的區別是，東方學家使用的權威及其常委會作為專家否認不，以掩蓋其深層次的感情與一對伊斯蘭教地毯的行話，其目的是證明他們的“客觀”和“科學公正。”

That is one point.這是一點。 The other distinguishes a historical pattern in what would otherwise be an undifferentiated characterization of Orientalism.另外一個歷史的模式區別在什麼本來是一個未分化的表徵東方。 Whenever in modern times there has been an acutely political tension felt between the Occident and its Orient (or between the West and its Islam), there has been a tendency to resort in the West not to direct violence but first to the cool, relatively detached instruments of scientific, quasi-objective representation.每當在近代出現了劇烈的政治緊張局勢感到其與西方和東方（或西方之間的伊斯蘭教），有一種傾向，在西方不訴諸直接的暴力行為，但首先要涼爽，相對超脫科學儀器，準客觀的代表性。 In this way Islam is made more clear, the true nature of its threat appears, an implicit course of action against it is proposed.這樣伊斯蘭教是更加明確，真正的性質出現的威脅，一個隱含的行動方針，提出反對。 In such a context both science and direct violence end up by being forms of aggression against Islam.在這種情況下既科學和直接暴力到頭來被各種形式的侵略伊斯蘭教。

Two strikingly similar examples illustrate my thesis.兩個驚人的類似的例子說明我的論文。 We can now see retrospectively that during the nineteenth century both France and England preceded their occupations of portions of the Islamic East with a period in which the various scholarly means of characterizing and understanding the Orient underwent remarkable technical modernization and development.現在，我們可以看到，在回顧 19世紀的法國和英國之前，他們的職業的部分伊斯蘭東與一時期，各種學術手段刻畫和理解東方的經歷顯著的技術現代化和發展。 The French occupation of Algeria in 1830 followed a period of about two decades during which French scholars literally transformed the study of the Orient from an antiquarian into a rational discipline.法國佔領阿爾及利亞在1830年之後的時期，共約 20年期間，法國學者字面上改變了研究東方從一個古物到一個合理的紀律。 Of course there had been Napoleon Bonaparte's occupation of Egypt in 1798, and of course one should remark the fact that he had prepared for his expedition by marshaling a sophisticated group of scientists to make his enterprise more efficient.當然，出現了拿破崙波拿巴的1798年佔領埃及，當然應該說法的事實，他已經準備為他的探險隊的編組一個複雜的群體科學家，使他的企業更有效率。 My point, however, is that Napoleon's short-lived occupation of Egypt closed a chapter.我的觀點，但是，是拿破崙的短暫佔領埃及封閉的一章。 A new one began with the long period during which, under de Sacy's stewardship at French institutions of Oriental study, France became the world leader in Orientalism; this chapter climaxed a little later when French armies occupied Algiers in 1830.一個新的開始與長期在此期間，根據德薩西的領導在法國東方研究機構，法國成為世界領先的東方，這一點章高潮後，當法國軍隊在1830年佔領阿爾及爾。

I do not at all want to suggest that there is a causal relationship between one thing and the other, nor to adopt the anti-intellectual view that all scientific learning necessarily leads to violence and suffering.我完全不想要建議是有因果關係，一件事，另一方面，也沒有採取反智認為，所有科學的學習一定會導致暴力和苦難。 All I want to say is that empires are not spontaneously born, nor during the modern period have they been run by improvisation.我只想說的是，帝國不是自發地出生，也有現代的過程中，他們一直由即興。 If the development of learning involves the redefinition and the reconstitution of fields of human experience by scientists who stand above the material they study, it is not impertinent to see the same development occurring among politicians whose realm of authority is redefined to include inferior regions of the world where new “national” interests can be discovered, and later seen to be in need of close supervision.如果開發學習的定義，涉及重組的人類經驗領域的科學家誰站在上面，他們研究的材料，它不是魯莽地看到同樣的發展領域發生的政治家，其權力是重新定義，以包括該地區的劣勢世界上新的“國家利益”可以被發現，後來看到有需要密切監督。 I very much doubt that England would have occupied Egypt in so long and massively institutionalized a way were it not for the durable investment in Oriental learning first cultivated by scholars like Lane and William James.我非常懷疑英國佔領埃及將在這樣一個制度化的長期和大規模的方式，如果不是為持久學習的第一東方投資耕地學者如巷和威廉詹姆斯。 Familiarly, accessibility, representability: these were what Orientalists demonstrated about the Orient.親密，交通方便，可表示：這些都是什麼東方表現出了東方。 The Orient could be seen, it could be studied, it could be managed.東方可以看到，它可以研究的，它可以進行管理。 It need not remain a distant, marvelous, incomprehensible and yet very rich place.它不需要仍然是一個遙遠的，奇妙的，不可理解的，但非常豐富的地方。 It could be brought home–or, more simply, Europe could make itself at home there, as it subsequently did.它可以帶回家，或者更簡單地說，歐洲可能使自己在家裡有，因為它後來沒有。

My second example is a contemporary one.我的第二個例子是當代的。 The Islamic Orient today is important for its resources or for its geopolitical location.伊斯蘭東方今天是很重要的資源或其地緣政治位置。 Neither of these, however, is interchangeable with the interests, needs or aspirations of the native Orientals.無論這些，但是，可以互換的利益，需要或願望的本土東方人。 Ever since the end of World War II, the United States has been taking positions of dominance and hegemony once held in the Islamic world by Britain and France.自從第二次世界大戰結束，美國已採取的立場的優勢和霸權一度在伊斯蘭世界的英國和法國。 With this replacement of one imperial system by another have gone two things: first, a remarkable burgeoning of academic and expert interest in Islam, and, second, an extraordinary revolution in the techniques available to the largely private-sector press and electronic journalism industries.有了這個系統更換一個帝國了另一個有兩件事情：第一，一個了不起的新興學科和專家的興趣伊斯蘭教，第二，一個非凡的技術革命，主要提供給私營部門的新聞媒體和電子行業。 Together these two phenomena, by which a huge apparatus of university, government and business experts study Islam and the Middle East and by which Islam has become a subject familiar to every consumer of news in the West, have almost entirely domesticated the Islamic world.連同這兩個現象，其中一個巨大的儀器的大學，政府和企業的專家研究伊斯蘭教與中東和伊斯蘭已成為其中一個主題熟悉每一個消費者的新聞，在西方，幾乎完全馴化的伊斯蘭世界。 Not only has that world become the subject of the most profound cultural and economic Western saturation in history–for no non-Western realm has been so dominated by the United States as the Arab-Islamic world is dominated today–by the exchange between Islam and the West, in this case the United States, is profoundly one-sided.不但成為這一主題，世界上最深厚的文化和經濟在歷史上西方飽和度為沒有非西方的領域是如此由美國主導的阿拉伯伊斯蘭世界的主宰今天是由伊斯蘭教與交流西方，在這種情況下，美國，正在深刻地是片面的。

So far as the United States seems to be concerned, it is only a slight overstatement to say that Moslems and Arabs are essentially seen as either oil suppliers or potential terrorists.至於美國似乎擔心，這只是一個輕微的誇張地說，穆斯林和阿拉伯人基本上被視為要么石油供應商或潛在的恐怖分子。 Very little of the detail, the human density, the passion of Arab-Moslem life has entered the awareness of even those people whose profession it is to report the Arab world.非常小的細節，人的密度，熱情的阿拉伯穆斯林的生活已經進入了認識，甚至那些人的專業報告，它是阿拉伯世界。 What we have instead is a series of crude, essentialized caricatures of the Islamic world presented in such a way as to make that world vulnerable to military aggression.我們有一系列的卻是原油，本質化的漫畫，伊斯蘭世界提出這樣一種方式，以使這一世界脆弱的軍事侵略。 I do not think it is an accident, therefore, that recent talk of US military intervention in the Arabian Gulf (which began at least five years ago, well before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) has been preceded by a long period of Islam's rational presentation through the cool medium of television and through “objective” Orientalist study: in many ways our actual situation today bears a chilling resemblance to the nineteenth-century British and French examples previously cited.我不認為這是一起事故，因此，最近的熱門話題，美國的軍事干預在阿拉伯海灣（開始至少5年以前，以及前蘇聯入侵阿富汗）一直之前，長期伊斯蘭教的理性介紹通過冷卻介質，通過電視和“客觀”東方研究：在許多方面我們今天的實際情況負有寒蟬更像19世紀的英國和法國的例子，以前引用。

Even if military aggression does not occur, the implications of all this are far-reaching.即使不發生軍事侵略，這一切所帶來的影響是深遠的。 As mentioned earlier, Islam has uniformly appeared to Europe and the West in general as a threat.如前所述，伊斯蘭教均勻似乎在歐洲和西方一般是一種威脅。 Today, the phenomenon is more in evidence than ever before because on the one hand there has been an enormous media convergence upon what has been called the emergence, return or resurgence of Islam, and on the other hand, because parts of the Islamic world–Palestine, Iran, Afghanistan, among other places–which have been undergoing various unequal processes of historical development, have also seemed to be encroaching upon traditional Western (more particularly American) hegemony.今天，這種現象更為明顯比以往任何時候，一方面是因為出現了一個巨大的媒體匯流後，那所謂的出現，退回或死灰復燃的伊斯蘭教，另一方面，由於部分伊斯蘭世界巴勒斯坦，伊朗，阿富汗等地，已接受各種不平等的歷史發展進程，也似乎直逼傳統的西方（特別是美國的）霸權。 The views of the experts and of the media are nearly identical on this.專家們的意見和媒體幾乎是一致的這一點。 Far from attempting to refine, or even dissent from, the gross image of Islam as a threat, the intellectual and policy community in the United States has considerably enforced and concentrated the image.遠離試圖加以改進，甚至異議從，總形象伊斯蘭教作為一種威脅，社會的知識和政策在美國有了很大的執行和集中的形象。 From Zbigniew Brzezinski's vision of the “crescent of crisis” to Bernard Lewis's “return of Islam,” the picture drawn is a unanimous one.從布熱津斯基的長遠目標是“新月”危機對伯納德劉易斯的“回歸伊斯蘭教，”那幅畫是一致的。 “Islam” means the end of civilization as “we” know it. “伊斯蘭”是指結束文明“我們”知道。 Islam is anti-human, antidemocratic, anti-Semitic, antirational.伊斯蘭教是反人性，反民主，反猶太人，反理性的。 University scholars whose professional lives are tied to the study of Islam have either been willing collaborators with this state of things, or if they have been silent, their marginality in the culture at large further confirms the fact that in the United States at least, there is no major segment of the polity, no significant sector of the culture, no part of the whole community capable of identifying sympathetically with the Islamic world.大學的學者，其職業生涯都與伊斯蘭教的研究已經被合作者願意與這個國家的東西，或者如果他們被沉默，在其邊緣文化的大進一步證實了事實是，在美國至少有不會有什麼大段的政體，沒有重要的部門的文化，沒有整個社會的一部分，能夠識別與伊斯蘭世界的同情。

On the other hand, most of the Third World is now fully bathed in US-produced TV shows, and is wholly dependent upon a tiny group of news agencies that transmit news back to the Third World, even in the large numbers of cases where the news is about the Third World.另一方面，大多數第三世界現在完全沐浴在美國生產的電視節目，完全取決於一小群的新聞機構，新聞傳送回第三世界，甚至在大量情況下，新聞是關於第三世界。 From being the source of news, the Third World generally, and Islamic countries in particular, have become consumers of news.從新聞的來源，一般的第三世界和伊斯蘭國家，特別是已成為消費者的消息。 For the first time in history (for the first time, that is, on such a scale) the Islamic world may be said to be learning about itself in part by means of images, histories and information manufactured in the West.這是第一次在歷史上（第一次，也就是在這樣一個規模），伊斯蘭世界，可以說是對自己的學習方式在部分圖片，歷史和信息生產的西方。 If one adds to this fact that students and scholars in the Islamic world are still dependent upon US and European libraries and institutions of learning for what now passes as Middle Eastern studies (consider, for example, that there isn'ta single first-rate, usable library of Arabic material in the entire Islamic world), plus the fact that English is a world language in a way that Arabic isn't, plus the fact that for its elite the Islamic world is now producing a managerial class of basically subordinate natives who are indebted for their economies, their defense establishments and for their political ideas to the worldwide consumer-market system controlled in the West–one gets an accurate, although extremely depressing, picture of what the media revolution (serving a small segment of the societies that produced it) has done to Islam.如果加上了這一點，學生和學者在伊斯蘭世界仍依賴美國和歐洲圖書館和機構現在通過什麼學習作為中東研究（考慮，例如，沒有任何一個一流的，圖書館阿拉伯語材料可用在整個伊斯蘭世界），加上英語是一種世界語言的方式，阿拉伯語是沒有，加上了一個事實，其精銳的伊斯蘭世界正在產生管理階層的基本下屬本地人誰是感謝他們的經濟，防務機構和他們的政治理念向全球消費市場體系控制在西一得到一個準確的，雖然非常沮喪，圖片什麼的媒體革命（一小部分服務的社會它的產生）做了伊斯蘭教。

To the extent that Islam is known about today, it is known principally in the form given it by the mass media: not only radio, films and Tv but also textbooks, magazines and best-selling, high-quality novels.在某種程度上，伊斯蘭是已知的今天，它是已知的，主要的形式給予它由大眾媒體：不僅廣播，電影和電視，而且教科書，雜誌和最暢銷的，高品質的小說。 This corporate picture of Islam on the whole is a depressing and misleading one.這些公司的圖片對整個伊斯蘭教是一個令人沮喪和誤導之一。 What emerges is that Ayatollah Khomeini, Col. Muammar e-Qaddafi, Sheik Ahmad Zaki Yamani and Palestinian terrorists are the best-known figures in the foreground, while the background is populated by shadowy (though extremely frightening) notions about jihad, slavery, subordination of women and irrational violence combined with extreme licentiousness.出現的是什麼霍梅尼，卡扎菲上校電子卡扎菲，謝赫艾哈邁德扎基亞馬尼和巴勒斯坦恐怖分子是最知名的人物在前台，而背景填充的影子（雖然非常可怕的）概念有關的聖戰，奴役，從屬對婦女的暴力行為和非理性的極端淫結合。 If you were to ask an average literate Westerner to name an Arab or Islamic writer, or a musician, or an intellectual, you might get a name like Kahlil Gibran in response, but nothing else.如果你問一個西方人的名字平均識字的阿拉伯或伊斯蘭作家，音樂家，還是一個知識分子，你可能會得到一個名稱如卡希爾紀伯倫的反應，但僅此而已。 In other words, whole swatches of Islamic history, culture and society simply do not exist except in the truncated, tightly packaged forms made current by the media.換句話說，整個殯儀館的伊斯蘭歷史，文化和社會根本不存在，除非被截斷，緊緊包裝形式使目前的媒體。 As Herbert Schiller has said, TV's images tend to present reality in too immediate and fragmentary a form for either historical or human continuity to appear.正如赫伯特席勒說，電視的圖像往往在目前的現實也立即和零散的形式對任何歷史或人類的連續性出現。 Islam therefore is equivalent to an undifferentiated mob of scimitar-waving oil suppliers, or it is reduced to the utterances of one or another Islamic leader who at the moment happens to be a convenient foreign scapegoat.因此，伊斯蘭教是相當於無差別的暴徒的彎刀，揮舞著石油供應商，或者是減少到話語的一個或另一個伊斯蘭領導人誰此刻正好是一個方便外國替罪羊。

We are well past the point of being able to say whether the media or the experts or the governments or the mass audiences are to blame for this state of affairs.我們早已過了點不能說是否媒體或專家或政府或集體的觀眾都歸咎於這個國家的事務。 With very few exceptions, one is struck by the blinding uniformity of the picture.除極少數例外，一個是深刻的致盲統一的圖片。 Perhaps it is true that the state of information that now exists on any subject is as standardized, and as low, as this one; and perhaps also it is true that whatever the experts, the special-interest groups, the manipulators touch they turn into flatness, ignorance and stereotypes.也許這是事實，國家的信息，現在存在的任何問題是標準化，低，因為這一個，或許也因為如此，無論是專家，特殊利益群體，他們變成觸摸操控平整度，無知和偏見。 But we must be especially alarmed that whether Islam is depicted on television, or whether it turns up in school textbooks, or whether it appears in best-selling novels by high-class novelists, or whether it's learnedly discussed by an academic expert on Islam (who is still respected in parts of the Arab world), the picture is almost exactly the same.但是，我們必須特別警惕，無論伊斯蘭教是描繪在電視上，還是原來在學校的教科書，還是出現在最暢銷的小說高級小說家，還是它的learnedly討論的學術專家伊斯蘭教（誰是仍然尊重部分阿拉伯世界），圖片幾乎是一模一樣的。 That does not mean that the picture is an inaccurate one; rather, it is a picture; it has the consistency of something made up, not of life; it portrays certain aspects of what Marshall Hodges has called the Islamicate world, but deforms them into a pattern that expresses certain things about a mass-media society, very little about what is referred to as Islam.這並不意味著該圖片是不準確的;相反，它是一個圖片，它具有一致性的東西組成，而不是生活，它描繪的某些方面有什麼馬歇爾霍奇斯稱為 Islamicate世界，但他們到變形這種模式對某些事情對一個大眾媒體的社會，很少有什麼是被稱為伊斯蘭教。 What is crucially important about this presentation of Islam is the media's ascendancy, their intellectual and perceptual hegemony, over the whole thing, and since the media sell their product to consumers who prefer simplicity to complexity, the uniform image of Islam that emerges is constructed out of much the same material from which history, society and humanity have been eliminated.什麼是極為重要的這個介紹伊斯蘭教的是媒體的優勢，他們的智力和感性的霸權，在整個事情，因為媒體出售他們的產品給消費者誰更喜歡簡單到複雜，統一形象伊斯蘭教浮現的是構造出有同樣的物質的歷史，社會和人類已被淘汰。

What can be done?什麼可以做什麼？ To begin with, what should be avoided is an attempt to alter, improve, beautify, make more appealing the image of Islam.首先，什麼是應該避免試圖改變，改善，美化，使更具吸引力伊斯蘭教的形象。 Such an effort falls into the trap of believing that reductive images can be made substitutes for a very complex reality, and it ends up perpetuating the entire system of ideological fictions by which Islam is made to do service for Western designs upon riches, peoples and territories that happen to call themselves Moslem.這種努力落入陷阱的還原圖像，認為可替代一個非常複雜的現實，它結束了延續了整個系統的思想小說，其中伊斯蘭教是由做設計服務，為西部財富後，人民和領土這種情況發生，自稱穆斯林。 A hard and fast distinction has to be made between serious consideration of the Islamicate world and nearly everything that passes for Islam in the media and in all but a few places in the culture.一個硬性區分之間必須作出認真考慮的Islamicate世界上幾乎所有的推移和對伊斯蘭教的媒體和所有，但一些地方的文化。 One cannot look for help in promoting serious investigative discussion of Islam–even as a subject of academic inquiry–among traditional Orientalists or within the normally constructed programs of Middle Eastern studies in today's Western universities.人們無法尋求幫助促進伊斯蘭認真調查討論，甚至作為一門學科的學術探究傳統的東方學家之間或在建方案通常中東研究在今天的西方大學。 On the other hand, younger scholars and students can be extremely useful in carrying work beyond prejudices and constrictions of their elders.另一方面，年輕學者和學生可以在執行工作非常有用的偏見與局限的超越他們的長輩。 And, just as important, a serious interest in the problems of Islamic society and Islamic peoples is very likely to develop not among the Middle East experts, or media people who have a purported specialty in modern Islam, but inside segments of the population who have a wider and more serious view of human problems in general: men and women who are committed not to Orient and Occident but to the cause of human rights, rather than lobbyists who act on behalf of human rights when they are paid to do so; students of comparative literature rather than Semitic philologists who know nothing about other literatures and who care little for the contemporary world; genuinely enterprising sociologists who know something about theory and care a great deal about issues confronting concrete societies, rather than specialists in the Islamic mind or in a monolithic thing called Islamic society.而且，同樣重要的一個嚴重問題的興趣在伊斯蘭社會和伊斯蘭人民的發展很可能並不在中東問題專家，或媒體人看來是誰擁有專業的現代化伊斯蘭教，但內部階層的人口誰也一個更廣泛和更嚴重的人權問題的看法一般：男人和女人誰不承諾東方和西方，而是對人權的事業，而不是說客的行為代表誰的人權時，他們支付給做;學生比較文學，而不是猶太人的語言學家誰知道沒有什麼其他的文獻，誰照顧小的，當今世界，真正進取社會學家誰知道一些有關理論和照顧了很多具體的社會中面臨的有關問題，而不是專家在伊斯蘭思想或在鐵板一塊的東西所謂的伊斯蘭社會。 Whatever the person, whatever the field of endeavor, I doubt that there can be any substitute for a genuinely engaged and sympathetic–as opposed to a narrowly political or hostile–attitude to the Islamic world.不管是什麼人，無論外地的努力，我相信可以有任何替代的真正參與和同情，而不是狹隘的政治或敵意的態度，伊斯蘭世界。 Indeed, I suspect that only if we get beyond politicized labels like “East” and “West” will we be able to reach the real world at all.事實上，我懷疑，只是如果我們超越政治化的標籤，如“東”和“西”，我們才能達到真正的世界所有。

As for what the Islamic, and more especially the Arab-Islamic, world might do, this can be put very simply.至於什麼是伊斯蘭，更特別是阿拉伯，伊斯蘭，世界可以做，可以把這個非常簡單。 There is no longer any excuse for bewailing the hostility of the “West” toward the Arabs and Islam and then sitting back in outraged righteousness.不再有任何藉口怨聲載道的敵意的“西方”對阿拉伯人和伊斯蘭教，然後坐在憤怒的義。 When the reasons for this hostility and those aspects of the “West” that encourage it are analyzed, an important step has been taken toward fighting it, but that is by no means the whole way.當這種敵視的原因和這些方面的“西方”，鼓勵它進行了分析，一個重要的步驟已經邁出爭取它，但絕不是整體的方式。 Certainly there are great dangers today in actually following, actually fulfilling this hostile image of Islam–and that has only been the doing, it is true, of some Moslems and some Arabs and some black Africans.當然有很大的危險，其實今天在下面，其實實現這一敵對形象，伊斯蘭教和只有一直是這樣做，這是事實，一些穆斯林和阿拉伯人和一些非洲黑人。 But such fulfillments underline the importance of what still has to be done.但是，這種 fulfillments強調其重要性還有什麼要做。 In the great rush to industrialize, modernize and develop itself, the Islamicate world has been compliant about turning itself into a great consumers' market.在偉大急於實現工業化，現代化和發展本身，Islamicate世界已經符合有關把自己成為一個偉大的消費者的市場。 To dispel the myths and stereotypes of Orientalism, the world as a whole has to be given an opportunity to see Moslems and Orientals producing a different form of history, a new kind of sociology, a new cultural awareness: in short, the relatively modest goal of writing a new form of history, investigating the Islamicate world and its many different societies with a genuine seriousness of purpose and a love of truth.為了消除誤解和成見的東方學，世界作為一個整體將有機會看到穆斯林和東方人產生不同形式的歷史，一種新的社會學，一個新的文化意識：總之，相對溫和的目標寫一個新形式的歷史，調查 Islamicate世界和它的許多不同的社會有真正嚴肅的目的和愛情的真相。 But, alas, we must recognize that even with vast sums of money easily available, the Islamic world as a whole does not seem interested in promoting learning, building libraries, establishing research institutes whose main purpose would be modern scientific attention to Islamic realities and to seeing whether in fact there is something specifically Islamic about the Islamic world.但是，唉，我們必須承認，即使巨額資金容易獲得，伊斯蘭世界作為一個整體似乎不感興趣，促進學習，建立圖書館，建立研究機構，其主要目的是現代科學的關注現實和伊斯蘭其實，看看是否有一些具體伊斯蘭對伊斯蘭世界。

Why is there a rush to produce row upon row of functionally illiterate technicians–with each new generation more likely than its predecessors to be vulnerable to the media revolution in its worst excesses?為什麼會出現一排後，急於生產排半文盲技術人員與每個新的一代比其前任更可能是脆弱的媒體革命，在其最惡劣的暴行？ This is the great question of the hour.這是大問題的時間。 If it is a fact that this is the general direction taken by the Third World countries that have recently gained their independence, it isn't much of a consolation to say confidently that the problem is not an Islamic one but a social and cultural one.如果這是事實，這是大方向採取的第三世界國家，最近獲得了獨立，它是沒有多大的安慰滿懷信心地說，問題不是一個，而是一個伊斯蘭社會和文化之一。 Nor is the rhetorical attack upon neo-imperialism very convincing at a time when national governments and rulers openly espouse values that further the new style of imperialism without colonies.也不是修辭的攻擊後，新帝國主義的非常有說服力，當時各國政府和統治者公開信奉的價值觀，進一步新的樣式沒有帝國主義殖民地。 To say that this reflects a preoccupation with rhetoric and style at the expense of concrete substance is, however, not to have learned anything from what we have been calling the distortion of the Arab-Islamic image in the Western media.如果說，這反映了一種關注和風格與修辭在具體內容是犧牲，但是，不知道有什麼東西從我們一直在呼籲歪曲阿拉伯伊斯蘭的形象在西方媒體。 That this distortion has occurred at all is a function of power, and in this instance style and image are direct political indices of power.本畸變發生在所有的權力是一個函數，並在此實例的風格和形象，直接的政治權力的指標。 Thus, we must concede that any drastic attempt to correct distortions of Islam and the Arabs is a political question involving the use and deployment of power.因此，我們必須承認，任何急劇的企圖糾正歪曲伊斯蘭教和阿拉伯人是一個政治問題，涉及使用和部署的權力。

Let me return to the power of the media in the current situation involving Islam.讓我回到媒體的力量在當前形勢下，涉及伊斯蘭教。 As the press comes to perceive an increasing number of Moslems as American enemies, rulers like Egypt's President Anwar el-Sadat (whose remark that Khomeini was a lunatic and a disgrace to Islam was repeated ad nauseam) have been made to seem like a more desirable Islamic norm.由於記者來到感知越來越多的穆斯林作為美國的敵人，統治者像埃及總統薩達特（他說，在霍梅尼是一個瘋子和一個恥辱伊斯蘭教重複生厭）已作出看起來像是一個更可取伊斯蘭規範。 The same is true of the Saudi royal family, although what generally goes unreported as a result is a considerable amount of disturbing information and, in the case of Iran, this deepens the hostage crisis.同樣是真正的沙特王室，但一般去隱瞞什麼，結果是一個相當令人不安的信息，並在伊朗的案件，這加深了人質危機。

Since the Camp David agreements of 1978 there has been a consensus that Sadat is our friend in the region; along with Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel he has been openly proclaiming his willingness to become a regional policeman and to give the United States bases on his territory.自1978年戴維營協議已有一個共識，就是我們的朋友薩達特是在該地區，隨著總理貝京以色列，他一直公開宣稱，他願意成為一個地區警察，並賦予他的美國基地領土。 As a consequence, nearly everything reported out of Egypt effectively makes his point of view seem like the correct one on matters Egyptian, Arab and regional.因此，幾乎所有報出埃及有效地使他的觀點似乎是正確的事宜埃及，阿拉伯和地區。 Egypt and the Arab world, in fact, now often reported with a view to confirming Sadat's pre-eminence; little appears about the widespread opposition to him.埃及和阿拉伯世界，事實上，現在經常報導，以確認薩達特的重要地位，很少出現對他的普遍反對。 Exactly the same thing happened during the Pahlevi regime, of course, when, with the exception of Berkeley scholar Hamid Algar, no one paid the slightest attention to the potential of the Shah's religious and political opposition.正是同樣的事情發生在巴列維政權，當然，當與異常柏克萊學者哈米德阿爾加，絲毫沒有人支付的注意潛在的沙阿的宗教和政治反對派。 Many of our political, military, strategic and economic investments today are made through Sadat, and by virtue of Sadat's perspective on things.我們的許多政治，軍事，戰略和經濟投資，今天通過薩達特，薩達特和憑藉的角度對事物。

There are other reasons too.也有其他原因。 One is the Middle East's sensitive domestic aspects for this country.一個是中東的敏感為這個國家的國內問題。 It is no accident, for example, that even after Watergate and the revelations about the Central Intelligence Agency (and even with the Freedom of Information Act), there have been no major discoveries concerning US activities in the Middle East.這並非偶然，例如，即使在水門事件的揭露和對中央情報局（甚至與信息自由法），有沒有重大發現有關美國在中東的活動。 This is surprising in the case of Iran, not simply because so many Americans were on the take from the Shah but also because of Israel's extremely close involvement with the United States there under the ex-Shah's regime.這是令人驚訝的案件伊朗，而不是僅僅因為如此多的美國人對從伊朗國王，但也因為以色列非常密切參與同美國有根據前巴列維國王的政權。 Savak was set up with the direct help of the Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, and, as in so many other cases, the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation cooperated willingly with the Israeli secret services.薩瓦克成立的直接協助下，摩薩德，以色列情報機構，而且，正如在許多其他情況下，美國中央情報局和聯邦調查局合作，願意與以色列秘密服務。

In addition, there is an increasingly influential new lobby in this country whose main function is to assure the US public that the present Arab regimes in the Gulf are stable.此外，還有一個越來越有影響力的新大廳在這個國家，其主要職能是向美國公眾表示，目前在海灣阿拉伯政權的穩定。 Among all the reporters for the major networks and newspapers, in fact, only CBS's Ed Bradley noted on November 24, 1979, that all information about the November occupation of the Great Mosque in Mecca came from the Government and that no other news was permitted.在所有記者的主要網絡和報紙，事實上，只有哥倫比亞廣播公司的埃德布拉德利指出，11月24日，1979年，所有的信息在11月佔領了大清真寺麥加來自政府，而且沒有其他消息是允許的。 Subsequently, The Christian Science Monitor's Helena Cobban reported from Beirut on November 30 that the mosque's seizure had a very definite political meaning, that far from being Islamic fanatics, the attackers were part of a political network having a secular as well as an Islamic program, pointedly directed at the political and financial monopoly held by the Saudi royal family.後來，基督教科學箴言報的海倫娜科貝恩報導貝魯特 11月30日，該清真寺的發作有一個非常明確的政治含義，這遠遠不是伊斯蘭狂熱分子，襲擊者是一個部分的政治網絡有一個世俗的，也是一個伊斯蘭方案，針對尖銳的政治和金融壟斷舉行的沙特皇室。 One month after her article appeared, the Saudi spokesman for the group, who had given Cobban the story, was picked up off a Beirut street and has disappeared; Saudi intelligence is reportedly behind the man's abduction.一個月後，她的文章出現，沙特新聞發言人小組，誰給了科班的故事，是拿起了貝魯特街頭，後失踪;據報導，沙特情報背後的人的綁架。

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we are probably going to have an even more dramatic cleavage separating good Moslems from bad.隨著蘇聯入侵阿富汗，我們很可能將會有一個更加戲劇性的裂解分離好穆斯林從壞。 We will undoubtedly be seeing ever more news hailing the achievements of good Moslems like Sadat, Pakistan's Zia ul-Haq and the Afghan Moslem insurgents–more equating of good Islam with anti-Communism and, if possible, with modernization.我們無疑將看到越來越消息歡呼成績好穆斯林喜歡薩達特，巴基斯坦齊亞哈克和阿富汗穆斯林叛亂分子，更良好的伊斯蘭教等同與反共產主義，如果可能，現代化。 As for Moslems who do not serve our purpose, they will, as always, be portrayed as backward fanatics.至於穆斯林誰不為我所用，他們將一如既往，被描繪成落後的狂熱分子。

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